Schizophrenic Representative Investors by Maymin, Philip Z.
Schizophrenic Representative Investors 
 
Philip Z. Maymin 
 
 
Department of Finance and Risk Engineering, NYU-Polytechnic Institute, Brooklyn, NY 
 
Philip Z. Maymin 
Department of Finance and Risk Engineering 
NYU-Polytechnic Institute 
Six MetroTech Center 
Brooklyn, NY 11201 
 
Phone: (718)260-3175 
Fax: (718)260-3355 
 
Email: phil@maymin.com 
 
(Submitted March 29, 2010) 
 
Representative investors whose behaviour is modelled by a deterministic finite automaton 
generate complexity both in the time series of each asset and in the cross-sectional 
correlation when the rule governing their behaviour is schizophrenic, meaning the investor 
must hold multiple seemingly contradictory beliefs simultaneously, either by switching 
between two different rules at each time step, or computing different responses to different 
assets. 
 
Keywords: complexity; representative investor; deterministic; behavioural 
 
  
Schizophrenic Representative Investors 
Abstract: Representative investors whose behavior is modeled by a deterministic 
finite automaton generate complexity both in the time series of each asset and in 
the cross-sectional correlation when the rule governing their behavior is 
schizophrenic, meaning the investor holds multiple seemingly contradictory 
beliefs simultaneously, either by switching between two different rules at each 
time step, or computing different responses to different assets. 
 
1. Introduction 
Observed complexity need not be the result of a complex underlying process. Most 
famously, Conway’s Game of Life has very simple rules for the evolution of cells on 
an infinite checkerboard, but generates very complex behavior (Gardner 1970). 
Indeed, simple rules often lead not merely to complex-looking behavior, but to 
complete universal computability (Wolfram 2005); in this sense, simple rules can 
lead to maximally complex behavior. It is therefore useful to explore the simplest 
possible rules that can lead to complexity. 
A recent paper introduced a model of a deterministic representative agent 
trading a single asset based solely on its price history and found that of the 128 
distinct possible rules, only one generated complexity. Because the rule is unique, 
and because it relies on only one investor trading only one asset based only on 
past movements, this model is known as the minimal model of financial complexity 
(Maymin 2011). 
This paper extends the minimal model of financial complexity in two ways. 
The first extension ostensibly allows for multiple investors by allowing different 
rules to govern on consecutive time steps. One interpretation of this wrinkle is that 
there are two investors who take turns being the “representative” investor. 
However, an alternative interpretation is that there is still a single unique 
representative investor, but that investor follows a schizophrenic rule that is a 
combination of two other rules.  The impact of this first extension is that there are 
many pairs of rules, each of which by themselves do not generate complexity, 
which do generate complexity when they are alternated. 
The second extension allows for multiple assets. The representative agent 
follows a single deterministic trading rule, but that rule governs the portfolio 
decision of every asset jointly. In other words, rather than merely deciding at each 
time step whether to buy or sell the market asset based on the past few 
movements of the market asset, the representative investor must decide at each 
time step whether to buy or sell each of the available assets based on the past few 
movements of each of the assets. This representative investor is considered 
schizophrenic as well because he essentially evaluates assets differently even if 
they have the same history of past movements.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
terminology and reviews the minimal model of financial complexity. Section 3 
demonstrates the results of the schizophrenic investor who switches rules each 
time step. Section 4 demonstrates the results of the schizophrenic investor who 
follows a single rule but on two assets. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Basic Model 
The basic model uses an iterated finite automaton (IFA) applied to the past w 
movements of the asset in reverse order (i..e, starting with the most recent one 
first). An IFA is completely represented by a state transition diagram. For example, 
the minimal model of financial complexity known as rule 54 follows the following 
diagram: 
 
Every IFA has a finite number of states. The minimal number of states for 
non-degenerate cases turns out to be two; these two states are labeled “1” and “2” 
in the above diagram. The investor always started in the special state “1” each day. 
Then, he looks back on yesterday’s movement. Was the market UP yesterday? 
Then he follows the arrow leaving state “1” that is labeled “UP.” That arrow leads 
back to state “1.” Was the market UP the day before yesterday? Then the investor 
again follows the “UP” arrow. If the market had been down, he would have 
followed the “DOWN” arrow.  
The right hand side of the label of each arrow that he is following 
represents the investor’s current inclination to buy or sell the asset. So after 
looking at yesterday’s UP return, he would be inclined to sell, but he does not do so 
yet, because he has not gone through all of the past price movements. Only on the 
last movement does the investor then decide whether to buy or sell, based on what 
is on the most recent arrow that he followed. 
The number of past movements that the investor looks at is called his 
lookback window and is denoted w. The number of states in his IFA is denoted s 
and the number of possible “actions” is denoted by k. An action is a possible 
decision he might make. In the example above, the investor had k = 2 possible 
actions, buy or sell. If the investor could also choose to hold, then he would have 
k = 3 possible actions. 
The initial history is for convenience assumed to be a sequence of w buys. 
For rules that generate complexity, this choice of initial history is arbitrary because 
any other choice merely shifts the entire time series forward or backward. 
The number of different possible rules for an IFA with s states and k actions 
is 

s k 
sk
 and (Wolfram 2003) lays out a convenient numbering scheme such that 
any such IFA can be uniquely identified by a number between 0 and 

s k 
sk
1. For 
example, in the 2-state, 2-action minimal IFAs, there are 44 = 256 different possible 
rules. However, half of those rules are effectively duplicates because they merely 
relabel state “1” as state “2” and vice-versa. Of the 128 unique rules, only one (rule 
54) generates complex behavior, where complexity is defined as having a period of 
at least half of the maximum possible cycle length: for a lookback window of w and 
k possible actions, the IFA must cycle within kw time steps because the sequence of 
past history must have repeated itself at least once by then.  
3. Alternating Rules 
Imagine if the representative investor changes which rule he follows every day. 
Specifically imagine if he alternates between two different rules. On day one and all 
subsequent odd-numbered days, he evaluates the last w price movements of the 
market asset by following rule 1. On day two and all subsequent even-numbered 
days, he evaluates the last w price movements of the market asset by following 
rule 2. In this sense he is a schizophrenic representative investor, where 
schizophrenic is used in its non-medical sense to mean a person simultaneously 
holding conflicting beliefs. 
Would such a situation result in more rules that generate complexity? This 
question demonstrates the necessity of actually doing the simulation to determine 
the answer. For example, a slightly different question generates a completely 
different answer: if we fix the rule but alternate the lookback window between w 
to w + 1, it turns out there is no rule, including rule 54, which generates 
complexity. 
However, in the case of alternating rules, there are substantially more 
combinations that generate complexity. The table below lists all of the pairs of 
rules that generate complex financial time series with a period at least as long as 
that of the single rule 54.  
 39 52 54 60 97 99 114 141 148 156 188 193 195 201 216 227 233 
39   1022   1022    1022    1022    
52     1274 1588    1588 1272       
54   889  1392 1778 1022 1022 1588 1778 1392   889    
60                  
97  1274 1392           1392   1284 
99 1022 1588 1778           1778 1022   
114   1022           1022    
141   1022           1022    
148   1588         1274  1588    
156 1022 1588 1778           1778 1022   
188  1272 1392           1392   1272 
193         1274       1284  
195                  
201   889  1392 1778 1022 1022 1588 1778 1392   889    
216   1022   1022    1022    1022    
227   1496         1284  1496    
233     1284      1272       
 
There are a total of 68 rule pairs exhibiting complexity and only two singlet 
rules: the rule pair (54, 54), which is the same as the single rule 54, and the rule 
pair (201, 201), which is the same as the single rule 201. Each has a period of 889. 
Recall that rule 201 is the same as rule 54 but with states 1 and 2 relabeled. 
The rule pairs are not symmetric. Notice that the rule pair (39, 54) is 
complex but the rule pair (54, 39) is not.  
The figure below shows an example of how two rules, each of which by 
itself generates repetitive, non-complex time series, can combine to generate 
extended complexity.  
 
Rule 52 by itself has a period of 30, meaning its sequence of UPs and 
DOWNs repeat every 30 time steps. Rule 99 is even simpler: it always goes UP so it 
has a period of 1 time step. But when the schizophrenic representative investor 
alternates between rule 52 and rule 99, the resulting time series is even more 
complex than the single rule 54: its period is 1,588.  
The figure below graphs all of the distinct complex time series that can 
result from the rule pairs. A schizophrenic representative investor has 
substantially more variety and diversity in complexity than the single rule 54. 
 
4. Multiple Assets 
To extend the basic model to allow for the simultaneous pricing of multiple assets, 
we can interpret each of the k actions as representing an entire portfolio. Consider 
the case of m = 2 assets, each of which could be either bought or sold. Then there 
are k = 2m possible actions. Interpreting the number k in base-2 gives us a zero or a 
one for each asset, representing either a sale or a buy, respectively. 
Allowing multiple assets increases the search space of possible rules 
exponentially because the number of possible rules is 

s 2m 
s2m
. Even for m = 2 
assets and still only s = 2 states, there are 88 = 16,777,216 possible rules.  
The natural extension of assuming all up movements for an initial history is 
to assume that each asset had all up movements in its initial history; thus, the 
initial history would be a w-length sequence of identical actions, namely 2m – 1, 
which in binomial notion is a sequence of m ones. 
How many of those millions of rules actually generate complex behavior in 
each of the financial assets? We can run each of the rules with a lookback window 
of e.g. w = 12 and count the number of rules that generate asset histories for 100 
time steps without repetition in either asset and for which the two assets are not 
either identical (correlation of one) or exactly opposite (correlation of negative 
one).  
There are 6,266 rules that fit those criteria. Some of those rules are repeats; 
there are only 3,986 distinct rules. That means less than 2 percent of 1 percent of 
all of the 16,777,216 possible rules generate complex behavior. Unlike the minimal 
model of financial complexity with a single asset, these rules are not unique, but 
they are still quite rare. 
What do the evolutions of these rules look like? The figure below shows the 
accumulation of 500 time steps for both assets from each of the 3,986 complex 
rules. Thus, there are 7,972 time series plots below. Note that the most extreme 
possible time series would be lines starting from the origin and ending either at 
+500 or -500 because those would represent all UPs or all DOWNs for the asset in 
question. None such appear because such evolutions are non-complex and were 
filtered when we discarded short-cycle evolutions. 
 Just about every possible path seems to be represented here. But with what 
probability? The graph below shows the histogram of the terminal values of each 
of the assets. 
 
Notice that the distribution appears to be slightly negative skewed and fat-
tailed. Indeed, the skewness of the distribution is -0.39 and the kurtosis is 5.2. This 
conforms with typical stylized facts about the markets which also often appear to 
have negative skewness and excess kurtosis. 
However, those numbers are cross-sectional in nature, and look across a 
variety of different rules. A more interesting measure of complexity is not the 
simple overall value but the diversity that is possible.  
What does the distribution of the skewness and kurtosis look like if we 
compute them for each possible path of each asset? The figures below show the 
results. Note that these histograms are plotted on a log-probability scale so that 
the outliers are visible. 
 
 
Notice the broad range of skewness and kurtosis that is possible. Just as in 
the real world we see both positive and negative skewness for different assets, so 
too do we see them as the result of this model. And just as in the real world we see 
occasionally thinner tails (kurtosis below three), medium tails (kurtosis around 
three), and fat tails (kurtosis above three), so too do we see them emerge from this 
model, including outliers as high as 12. 
We can also look at the distribution of pairwise correlations by calculating 
the correlation between the two assets in a given rule, and plotting the histogram 
of all such correlations across all of the interesting rules. 
 
The pairwise correlations tend to be clustered around zero though there 
are extremes stretching as far as -0.96 and +0.86. But how do these correlations 
relate to recent activity in the two assets? 
Let’s calculate the rolling correlation over 50 time steps and compare it to 
the return of the best performing asset in that same period of 50 time steps. Why 
the return of the better performing asset? Because we know if the better one has a 
negative return, then so must the other one, and because this way we can see if 
there is a difference between environments where one asset is up and one is down 
as opposed to an environment where both are down. With those numbers, we can 
then plot the relationship between the correlation and the return of the better 
asset across all time periods and all interesting rules. That figure is below. 
 
Notice that when the better performing asset is negative, meaning both 
assets had negative returns for the period, the correlation tends to increase the 
worse the performance is. In other words, in times of broad market corrections, 
the deeper the correction, the higher the correlation. This also conforms with a 
broad stylized fact about the market. 
Similarly, but less pronounced, as the better performing asset increases in 
return, the correlation has a tendency to decrease.  
Combining these two insights and recalling that the implied volatility for 
options on an index depends strongly on the implied correlation between the 
constituent assets comprising the index suggests that the implied volatility skews 
on options traded on the market would have a steep skew for puts and a less steep 
but still downward sloping skew on calls, matching another stylized fact about 
index implied volatility markets. 
5. Conclusion and Summary 
The complexity we observe in financial time series need not result from 
complexity in the fundamental rules of the market. A generic description of simple 
rules is presented that generates complexity similar to those in the real world. 
Even a representative investor trading a single market asset can generate 
complexity with a simple, naïve, and deterministic rule.  
Multiple traders can be modeled as a sequence of representative investors 
each following a simple rule. An alternative interpretation is that there is still only 
a single representative investor, but the rule he follows alternates between days. 
Multiple assets can be modeled by reinterpreting the possible actions of 
each trade to represent choices about every possible asset. 
The variety and complexity of possible results matches that found in the 
real world. The generated time series tend to have negative skewness, high 
kurtosis, and correlations that increase during market downturns.  
All these results occur without any parameter fitting but merely by 
exploring the space of possible rules given a simple framework.  
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